2025-03-19, 12:04 PM
Hôm qua Toà Bạch Ốc đã release hồ sơ vụ ám sát cố TT Kennedy. Tôi mò tới đoạn ông Diệm và vụ đảo chính đã đưa đến cái chết của hai cụ Diệm và Nhu. Bài post của tôi đã được các anh em dịch ra tiếng Việt. Tôi đăng lại post của tôi để ai hứng thú thì tìm hiểu. Tập hồ sơ được công bố có hơn 80 ngàn trang, nên giải mã sẽ là một việc đường dài khi tôi rảnh. 😆😂
Link tiếng Việt của anh em, có cái thiếu vì tôi thêm trong bài tiếng Anh sau khi bài đã được copy sang nhóm. Tôi vừa mò vừa viết nên hơi lung tung. 😆
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1ASWCbP...tid=wwXIfr
…
https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/release-2025
Trong hồ sơ vụ án Kennedy có nhiều tài liệu mật liên quan đến Vietnam.
More from Kennedy’s files:
VIETNAMESE OFFICERS BEGGED KENNEDY TO REMOVE DIEM
A secret CIA document shows that in 1962, a group of South Vietnamese rebel officers sent a letter to President Kennedy, asking him to replace their leader, President Diem.
The letter, signed by Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi and others, claimed Diem’s government was “corrupt and inefficient” in fighting the Communists.
They urged Kennedy to “reappraise U.S. policy” and support a government that truly represented the people.
The officers, who had fled to Cambodia, sent their plea through the U.S. Embassy, hoping for American intervention.
….
1962 CIA document shows that General Tran Van Ly talked about removing South Vietnam’s leader, President Diem, because he feared the country would “fall into the hands of the Communists.”
Ly said a takeover should “avoid bloodshed” and use a “small force” to keep things under control.
He suggested that after the coup, “three general officers” should run the country until “the people would be able to choose the head of state.”
The report also says Ly had been jailed after a failed coup in 1960 and was later forced to promise loyalty to Diem.
…
In September 1962, South Vietnam’s security chief, Tran Kim Tuyen, proposed a joint intelligence operation with Taiwan to gather information in Laos.
Tuyen warned that Laos’ political situation was worsening and suggested setting up spy stations on the Vietnam-Laos border and inside Laos.
He claimed this was necessary in case South Vietnam cut ties with Laos.
Taiwan’s intelligence chief agreed in principle but said he needed approval from his government before moving forward.
He sent a telegram to Taipei outlining the plan.
…
In August 1962, British Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Hohler, told a journalist that the only hope for Vietnam was a “third force”—a neutralist movement between Communism and the U.S.-backed government.
He claimed the U.S. was “not trained in guerrilla warfare” and could not win against the Communists. Another British diplomat, Counselor Burrows, went further, saying there was “no hope” of progress unless South Vietnam’s leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, was removed.
The report also mentions that British military officials were skeptical of the war effort, believing it was “not proceeding favorably” from a Western perspective.
…
August 1962, South Vietnamese Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chau issued a warning to President Ngo Dinh Diem about the growing threat of a coup.
According to a CIA report, Chau cautioned that tensions within the military were rising, and dissatisfaction with Diem’s leadership was reaching a critical point.
The details of the warning remain vague, but the document suggests that Chau’s concerns were serious enough to be flagged by U.S. intelligence.
File 176-10037-10452
…
CIA tracked BEHEIREN—Japan’s “Peace for Vietnam” Committee—formed in 1965 as an anti-American, anti-Vietnam War group.
Despite being presented as independent intellectuals, it was largely made up of ex-Communist Party members, leftist students, and progressive thinkers refusing control by Japan’s Communist Party.
The report identifies YOSHIKAWA, a “brilliant Communist,” as the group’s driving force.
The U.S. closely followed these movements, linking them to Cold War influence campaigns.
…
Late October, 1962
Deep inside the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government, a quiet but daring plan was unfolding. Declassified CIA files reveal that the Strategic Hamlet Program—meant to defend villages from communists—was more than it seemed.
Officials were secretly ordered to gather intelligence on North Vietnam, using former residents to map out key contacts behind enemy lines.
At the center of it all was Ngo Dinh Nhu, who hinted that the program was just the first step in something far bigger—a plan to slowly turn the tide against the North.
File No. 176-10036-10088
…
March 1963, South Vietnamese President Diem and Taiwan’s Vice President Chen Cheng held over 20 hours of secret talks, sparking speculation about a military alliance.
Chen is believed to have offered Diem combat troops in Vietnamese uniforms, military training, and technical support while requesting airfields and coastal bases for operations against China.
They also likely discussed joint attacks on North Vietnam and Laos, efforts to remove Cambodia’s Sihanouk, and concerns over Thailand’s neutrality.
At the end of the visit, Chen was seen in “excellent spirits,” suggesting some agreement was reached.
File 176-10036-1010
….
April 1963, President Diem and his top advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were fed up with U.S. military operations and saw them as a threat to Vietnam’s sovereignty.
They believed American forces, especially Special Forces, were acting without proper coordination and planned to demand a major troop reduction.
Diem was building a case, waiting for more U.S. “blunders” before confronting officials with “irrefutable evidence” to push them out.
File No. 176-10036-10095
…
Ngo Dinh Nhu, the brother and top advisor to President Diem, pushed for South Vietnam to phase out American aid.
Nhu claimed the U.S. was using aid to pressure Vietnam and called for self-sufficiency, even encouraging locals to produce weapons at home.
Vietnamese Air Force officers warned that without U.S. support, the government would collapse—but Nhu insisted on preparing for a full withdrawal of American assistance.
File No. 176-10036-10094
….
May 1963, Buddhist activists in Central Vietnam, linked to the reformed VNQDD, planned a coup against President Diem.
They aimed to seize military control, detain top officials, and use Diem’s own negotiation tactics against him.
Warnings emerged that without simultaneous action in Saigon, the Viet Cong could exploit the chaos and take control.
File No. 176-10036-10098
…
On July 15, 1963, members of Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen’s coup group delayed their planned takeover of President Diem’s government—not because they weren’t ready, but because they feared the Viet Cong would “intensify their activities” in the days before the Geneva Accords anniversary.
The plotters worried that launching their coup at the wrong time could leave them vulnerable to a Viet Cong offensive.
They decided to wait until after the anniversary before making their move.
Despite the delay, some sources claimed they still hoped to act before the end of July.
File 176-10036-10115
….
On July 16, 1963, General Duong Van Minh, a key U.S.-backed military advisor, warned that President Diem had “lost complete touch with the people.”
Minh said that Diem once had public support, but by 1960, he ruled as if he had a “mandate from heaven.”
He claimed the government was failing to control the growing Buddhist crisis and feared more self-immolations.
He also rejected the idea that Ngo Dinh Nhu could take over, saying it would prove the Viet Cong were right in claiming they were the only ones truly fighting for the people.
File 176-10036-10117
…
September 1963, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao told officials that Ngo Dinh Nhu, the powerful advisor to President Diem, admitted he was “considering dealing with the Communists.”
Thao claimed Nhu planned “major changes” to make South Vietnam’s economy more like Communist countries.
He also said Nhu’s contacts with the Communists came through “the Polish delegation to the International Control Commission.”
Thao, who was secretly plotting a coup, warned that Nhu’s plans must be stopped.
File 176-10036-10143
…
In September 1963, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao tried to convince the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) to support a coup against President Diem.
Thao claimed the coup would succeed in “three hours” and wanted the Air Force to “hinder or stop the forces of Brigadier General Huynh Van Cao” from assisting Diem.
A ranking VNAF officer warned that Air Force commander Huynh Huu Hien was “completely loyal to the regime.” Thao responded that if Hien refused to cooperate, “he could easily be killed.”
File 176-10036-10143
…
September 15, 1963—Saigon. Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh debates whether to overthrow President Diem, telling aides he will decide “in a day or two.”
By September 16, he hesitates, saying he needs “another week” to think.
The CIA reports that without clear U.S. support, Khanh will likely abandon the coup.
Still, his name is being circulated among generals plotting against Diem, and the CIA warns his involvement “cannot be completely discounted.”
File 176-10036-10131
…
September 19, 1963—Saigon. Government attorney Nguyen Huu Duong receives shocking intel: Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao has set the plan in motion.
The coup to remove President Diem and the Ngo family is scheduled for the week of September 22.
Thao, a Strategic Hamlet Inspector with deep ties to the military, names Generals Duong Van Minh and Le Van Kim as key players.
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh prepares to seize Hue while Thao strikes Saigon.
An aide to Khanh confirms it—“Thao is ready to move within a week.”
The clock is ticking.
File 176-10036-10134
To be continued
Link tiếng Việt của anh em, có cái thiếu vì tôi thêm trong bài tiếng Anh sau khi bài đã được copy sang nhóm. Tôi vừa mò vừa viết nên hơi lung tung. 😆
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1ASWCbP...tid=wwXIfr
…
https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/release-2025
Trong hồ sơ vụ án Kennedy có nhiều tài liệu mật liên quan đến Vietnam.
More from Kennedy’s files:
VIETNAMESE OFFICERS BEGGED KENNEDY TO REMOVE DIEM
A secret CIA document shows that in 1962, a group of South Vietnamese rebel officers sent a letter to President Kennedy, asking him to replace their leader, President Diem.
The letter, signed by Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi and others, claimed Diem’s government was “corrupt and inefficient” in fighting the Communists.
They urged Kennedy to “reappraise U.S. policy” and support a government that truly represented the people.
The officers, who had fled to Cambodia, sent their plea through the U.S. Embassy, hoping for American intervention.
….
1962 CIA document shows that General Tran Van Ly talked about removing South Vietnam’s leader, President Diem, because he feared the country would “fall into the hands of the Communists.”
Ly said a takeover should “avoid bloodshed” and use a “small force” to keep things under control.
He suggested that after the coup, “three general officers” should run the country until “the people would be able to choose the head of state.”
The report also says Ly had been jailed after a failed coup in 1960 and was later forced to promise loyalty to Diem.
…
In September 1962, South Vietnam’s security chief, Tran Kim Tuyen, proposed a joint intelligence operation with Taiwan to gather information in Laos.
Tuyen warned that Laos’ political situation was worsening and suggested setting up spy stations on the Vietnam-Laos border and inside Laos.
He claimed this was necessary in case South Vietnam cut ties with Laos.
Taiwan’s intelligence chief agreed in principle but said he needed approval from his government before moving forward.
He sent a telegram to Taipei outlining the plan.
…
In August 1962, British Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Hohler, told a journalist that the only hope for Vietnam was a “third force”—a neutralist movement between Communism and the U.S.-backed government.
He claimed the U.S. was “not trained in guerrilla warfare” and could not win against the Communists. Another British diplomat, Counselor Burrows, went further, saying there was “no hope” of progress unless South Vietnam’s leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, was removed.
The report also mentions that British military officials were skeptical of the war effort, believing it was “not proceeding favorably” from a Western perspective.
…
August 1962, South Vietnamese Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chau issued a warning to President Ngo Dinh Diem about the growing threat of a coup.
According to a CIA report, Chau cautioned that tensions within the military were rising, and dissatisfaction with Diem’s leadership was reaching a critical point.
The details of the warning remain vague, but the document suggests that Chau’s concerns were serious enough to be flagged by U.S. intelligence.
File 176-10037-10452
…
CIA tracked BEHEIREN—Japan’s “Peace for Vietnam” Committee—formed in 1965 as an anti-American, anti-Vietnam War group.
Despite being presented as independent intellectuals, it was largely made up of ex-Communist Party members, leftist students, and progressive thinkers refusing control by Japan’s Communist Party.
The report identifies YOSHIKAWA, a “brilliant Communist,” as the group’s driving force.
The U.S. closely followed these movements, linking them to Cold War influence campaigns.
…
Late October, 1962
Deep inside the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government, a quiet but daring plan was unfolding. Declassified CIA files reveal that the Strategic Hamlet Program—meant to defend villages from communists—was more than it seemed.
Officials were secretly ordered to gather intelligence on North Vietnam, using former residents to map out key contacts behind enemy lines.
At the center of it all was Ngo Dinh Nhu, who hinted that the program was just the first step in something far bigger—a plan to slowly turn the tide against the North.
File No. 176-10036-10088
…
March 1963, South Vietnamese President Diem and Taiwan’s Vice President Chen Cheng held over 20 hours of secret talks, sparking speculation about a military alliance.
Chen is believed to have offered Diem combat troops in Vietnamese uniforms, military training, and technical support while requesting airfields and coastal bases for operations against China.
They also likely discussed joint attacks on North Vietnam and Laos, efforts to remove Cambodia’s Sihanouk, and concerns over Thailand’s neutrality.
At the end of the visit, Chen was seen in “excellent spirits,” suggesting some agreement was reached.
File 176-10036-1010
….
April 1963, President Diem and his top advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were fed up with U.S. military operations and saw them as a threat to Vietnam’s sovereignty.
They believed American forces, especially Special Forces, were acting without proper coordination and planned to demand a major troop reduction.
Diem was building a case, waiting for more U.S. “blunders” before confronting officials with “irrefutable evidence” to push them out.
File No. 176-10036-10095
…
Ngo Dinh Nhu, the brother and top advisor to President Diem, pushed for South Vietnam to phase out American aid.
Nhu claimed the U.S. was using aid to pressure Vietnam and called for self-sufficiency, even encouraging locals to produce weapons at home.
Vietnamese Air Force officers warned that without U.S. support, the government would collapse—but Nhu insisted on preparing for a full withdrawal of American assistance.
File No. 176-10036-10094
….
May 1963, Buddhist activists in Central Vietnam, linked to the reformed VNQDD, planned a coup against President Diem.
They aimed to seize military control, detain top officials, and use Diem’s own negotiation tactics against him.
Warnings emerged that without simultaneous action in Saigon, the Viet Cong could exploit the chaos and take control.
File No. 176-10036-10098
…
On July 15, 1963, members of Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen’s coup group delayed their planned takeover of President Diem’s government—not because they weren’t ready, but because they feared the Viet Cong would “intensify their activities” in the days before the Geneva Accords anniversary.
The plotters worried that launching their coup at the wrong time could leave them vulnerable to a Viet Cong offensive.
They decided to wait until after the anniversary before making their move.
Despite the delay, some sources claimed they still hoped to act before the end of July.
File 176-10036-10115
….
On July 16, 1963, General Duong Van Minh, a key U.S.-backed military advisor, warned that President Diem had “lost complete touch with the people.”
Minh said that Diem once had public support, but by 1960, he ruled as if he had a “mandate from heaven.”
He claimed the government was failing to control the growing Buddhist crisis and feared more self-immolations.
He also rejected the idea that Ngo Dinh Nhu could take over, saying it would prove the Viet Cong were right in claiming they were the only ones truly fighting for the people.
File 176-10036-10117
…
September 1963, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao told officials that Ngo Dinh Nhu, the powerful advisor to President Diem, admitted he was “considering dealing with the Communists.”
Thao claimed Nhu planned “major changes” to make South Vietnam’s economy more like Communist countries.
He also said Nhu’s contacts with the Communists came through “the Polish delegation to the International Control Commission.”
Thao, who was secretly plotting a coup, warned that Nhu’s plans must be stopped.
File 176-10036-10143
…
In September 1963, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao tried to convince the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) to support a coup against President Diem.
Thao claimed the coup would succeed in “three hours” and wanted the Air Force to “hinder or stop the forces of Brigadier General Huynh Van Cao” from assisting Diem.
A ranking VNAF officer warned that Air Force commander Huynh Huu Hien was “completely loyal to the regime.” Thao responded that if Hien refused to cooperate, “he could easily be killed.”
File 176-10036-10143
…
September 15, 1963—Saigon. Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh debates whether to overthrow President Diem, telling aides he will decide “in a day or two.”
By September 16, he hesitates, saying he needs “another week” to think.
The CIA reports that without clear U.S. support, Khanh will likely abandon the coup.
Still, his name is being circulated among generals plotting against Diem, and the CIA warns his involvement “cannot be completely discounted.”
File 176-10036-10131
…
September 19, 1963—Saigon. Government attorney Nguyen Huu Duong receives shocking intel: Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao has set the plan in motion.
The coup to remove President Diem and the Ngo family is scheduled for the week of September 22.
Thao, a Strategic Hamlet Inspector with deep ties to the military, names Generals Duong Van Minh and Le Van Kim as key players.
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh prepares to seize Hue while Thao strikes Saigon.
An aide to Khanh confirms it—“Thao is ready to move within a week.”
The clock is ticking.
File 176-10036-10134
To be continued